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1	 Introduction
For as long as countries have imposed capital gains tax (CGT),1 taxpayers 
have been looking for ways of transferring economic value without becoming 
liable to pay it. Since CGT is usually triggered by the realisation of an asset, 
taxpayers soon realised that if they could shift economic value from their assets 
without selling or otherwise realising the assets, they could avoid, or at least 
defer, CGT. This led to the notion of share value shifting, which achieves this 
objective in relation to shares. Taxation authorities in turn recognised the dan-
ger which this form of tax avoidance holds for the integrity of a CGT regime 
and the need for measures to counter it.
At the outset the article provides some background on what share value 
shifting is and how anti-avoidance measures generally aim to prevent this form 
of tax avoidance. It also explains the scope of the anti-avoidance measures in 
the South African and Australian tax legislation and the manner in which the 
measures are incorporated in the general South African and Australian CGT 
regimes.
The article then focuses on the special rules in the South African tax legisla-
tion that govern the calculation of CGT in respect of share value shifting and 
considers some of the difficulties that arise from the fact that these measures 
fail to interact properly with the general CGT provisions. In the second part of 
the article, it considers which kinds of share value shifting are targeted by the 
value shifting anti-avoidance measures in the South African tax legislation and 
criticises the limited scope of these measures.
The issues of how to integrate the value shifting provisions in the general 
CGT regime and how far-reaching the anti-avoidance measures should be are 
not unique to South Africa. The article thus aims to provide some insight into 
how another jurisdiction with a comparable CGT regime, namely Australia, 
* The author also holds the position of lecturer in taxation law at the Law School of the University of 
Melbourne, Australia  The article is based on a draft paper presented at the annual conference of the 
Australasian Tax Teachers Association held in January 200 at the University of Melbourne  The article 
reflects the law as on 1 January 200
1 In some jurisdictions, share value shifts hold other (non-CGT) tax advantages  See, eg, The Commissioner 
of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia v Peabody 199 28 ATR  where share value shifting 
was used to reduce an income tax liability
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has addressed some of the difficulties that currently exist under the South 
African regime. In drawing the comparison between the South African and 
Australian value shifting anti-avoidance measures, the aim is not to present the 
latter regime as the only or even preferred one. (In fact, the Australian regime 
has been subjected to harsh criticism, mainly because of its extraordinary com-
plexity and the compliance burden that it creates.)2 The aim is rather to con-
sider whether some of the approaches followed by the Australian regime may 
work equally well in the South African context.
Lastly, it should be noted that this article only considers value shifting 
relating to shares, and not to interests in trusts or partnerships or to any other 
assets. It also only considers the implications for shares held on capital account, 
not as trading stock or as revenue assets. Non-CGT tax consequences that may 
be relevant, such as donations tax, stamp duty or secondary tax on companies, 
or consequences flowing from a breach of legislative provisions outside the 
Income Tax Act 58 of 192, are beyond the scope of the article and so is sec-
tion 10 (the general anti-avoidance provision) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 




The notion of what constitutes value shifting differs from one tax jurisdic-
tion to another. In South Africa it has been described as
“the effective transfer of value from one person to another without [such transfer] constituting an ordi-
nary disposal for CGT purposes”.
The Australian5 notion of a value shift is general and refers to
“transactions and other arrangements which result in the value of an asset being reduced with a con-
sequential increase in the value of another asset”.
The latter notion thus not only foresees the shifting of value from one person 
to another, but also between assets held by the same person. This difference is 
reflected in the countries’ respective legislative definitions of what constitutes 
value shifting.
Paragraph 1 of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 defines 
a “value shifting arrangement” as:
“an arrangement by which a person retains an interest in a company, trust or partnership, but follow-
ing a change in the rights or entitlements of the interests in that company, trust or partnership (other 
2 See, eg, Dirkis “The Nuts and Bolts of Value Shifting” 200 The Tax Specialist 18  
 Since the writing of this article s 10 has been replaced by s 80A–80L
 South African Revenue Service Draft Comprehensive Guide to Capital Gains Tax 59 available at http://
www sars gov za/cgt/Historical%20Development/CGT%20-%20Comprehensive%20Guide%201%20J
anuary%20200 pdf (accessed on 1 January 200)
5 Review of Business Taxation A Tax System Redesigned More Certain, Equitable and Durable Report 
(1999) 21 available at www rbt treasury gov au (accessed on 1 January 200)
 The concepts of  “value shifting arrangements”, “value shifts” and “value shifting” are used interchange-
ably throughout the article
than as a result of a disposal at market value as determined before the application of paragraph 8), 
the market value of the interest of that person decreases and–
(a) the value of the interest of a connected person in relation to that person held directly or indirectly 
in that company, trust or partnership increases; or
(b) a connected person in relation to that person acquires a direct or indirect interest in that com-
pany, trust or partnership”.
The first requirement for a value shifting arrangement is thus that the tax-
payer must hold an interest in a company and must retain that interest.7 The 
second requirement is that there must be a change in the rights or entitlements 
of the interests in that company. This change must in turn result8 in a reduction 
in the market value of the taxpayer’s interest in the company, and must also 
result in a connected person in relation to that taxpayer either experiencing an 
increase in the value of his or her interest in the company, or acquiring an inter-
est in the company.9 No tax avoidance purpose is required.
The scope of the Australian Income Tax Assessment Act 8 of 1997 (1997 
ITAA)10 differs in a number of important aspects.11 For example, the 1997 ITAA 
has no requirement that there must be a change in the rights or entitlements 
of the interests in the relevant company. Instead, as long as a person holding 
an interest in the company12 experiences a decrease in the value of his or her 
interest “under a scheme”1 and the company issues interests at a discount, or 
there is an increase in the market value of the interests in the company, it will 
constitute a value shift.1 It is important to note that there is no requirement 
that the shares be issued to another person, or that the shares that increased in 
value be held by another person, and it is thus possible to shift value between 
shares held by the same person. The scope of the 1997 ITAA share value shift-
ing regime is reduced by excluding value shifts that are likely to be reversed 
within four years (unless the interest is realised before the four year period),15 
7 Although the definition is potentially applicable to interests other than shares in a company, this article 
only considers the definition in this context
8 It is submitted that the words “following the change” do not connote a mere chronological sequence, but 
rather a causal link
9 The word “and” before subparagraph (a) of the definition suggests that subparagraph (a) or (b) must 
happen because of the change in the rights or entitlements of the interests in the company: in other words, 
subparagraph (a) or (b) must be causally linked to the change in the rights or entitlements of the interests 
in the company  
10 The share value shifting anti-avoidance measures of the 1997 ITAA are found in Division 725  See n 9 
infra for a brief overview of Division 725’s place within the broader value shifting regime of the 1997 
ITAA
11 See s 725-15  See also Dirkis 200 The Tax Specialist 172 and Fisher “Shifting Sands: The New Value 
Shifting Rules” 200 Taxation in Australia 521 for a discussion of all the conditions that must be met 
before a scheme will be caught by the value shifting provisions in Division 725
12 In terms of s 725-80, the person must control the company (see s 725-55 and the definition of “control (for 
value shifting purposes)” in s 995-1); or be an associate of the controller of the company (as defined in 
s 995-1); or must be an active participant in the scheme (if the company has less than 00 members; see 
s 725-5(2))  
1 The decrease in value must be reasonably attributable to the scheme  See s 725-15(1)(b)  See also s 725-
5 and the definition of a “scheme” in s 995-1
1 The holder of the interest that increased in value, or to whom shares were issued at a discount, must be 
the controller of the company (see n 12 supra); or an associate of the controller (see n 12 supra); or an 
associate of the holder of the interest that decreased in value (if the holder of the interest that decreased in 
value qualified as such because he or she was an associate of the controller of the company); or an active 
participant in the scheme (see n 12 supra)  See s 725-80
15 S 725-90
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as well as value shifts that resulted in decreases in interests’ market values of 
less than AU$150,000.1 The latter rule is aimed at reducing compliance and 
administration costs.17
In order to gauge the effectiveness of value shifting anti-avoidance 
measures (as is done in part 5 infra), they should be assessed in the light of their 
objectives. These measures usually have two objectives in mind. The first is to 
create a trigger for the calculation of capital gains (or losses). Typically, capi-
tal gains only arise when assets are realised, for example by sale or exchange. 
Consequently, if it were possible to transfer economic value without realising 
any assets in the process, no immediate capital gain would arise and the capital 
gain would be deferred until such time as the assets, to which economic value 
was transferred, are realised. To counter this, the anti-avoidance measures treat 
the transfer of economic value as a realisation event that triggers a capital gain 
(or loss).18 This ensures that two of the traditional criteria for a good tax sys-
tem, that of equity and efficiency, are adhered to, since the transfer of value is 
taxed consistently, irrespective of whether a taxpayer effected the transfer by 
way of conventional realisation (for example by sale) or by value shifting.19
A second objective of the anti-avoidance measures is to restore distortions 
caused by a value shift between an asset’s tax cost and market value. Capital 
gains are, generally speaking, calculated as the difference between an asset’s 
cost and its market value at realisation. Shifting economic value from an asset 
would distort the relationship between the asset’s market value and its tax cost 
and this would in turn result in a smaller capital gain on the realisation of that 
asset.20 The anti-avoidance measures thus aim to undo this distortion between 
an asset’s market value and tax cost.
The following example illustrates a typical value shift and how a taxpayer 
would have benefited, had no anti-avoidance measures existed. In January 
2002, Adam incorporated SACo (Pty) Ltd with issued share capital of R200, 
consisting of ten ordinary shares. By August 2005 the market value of the ten 
ordinary shares had increased to R500 (that is R50 per share). Adam wanted 
to give his daughter Beth a 50% interest in SACo (Pty) Ltd. If he had sold 
(or donated) five of his shares to her, he would have been liable for CGT on 
the increase in the value of these shares. Instead, Adam arranged with SACo 
to issue ten shares to Beth at a total subscription price of R50 (that is R5 per 
share). Because of the discount at which the new shares were issued to Beth, 
the market value of Adam’s shares decreased to R275 (that is R27,50 per 
share).21 He thus shifted some R225 worth of economic value from his shares 
to Beth’s shares. Despite this transfer of value, if no anti-avoidance measures 
1 S 725-70
17 See, eg, Review of Business Taxation A Platform for Consultation Discussion Paper 2 Building on a 
Strong Foundation Report (1999) 2 available at www rbt treasury gov au (accessed on 1 January 
200)
18 A Tax System Redesigned More Certain, Equitable and Durable 21
19 A Tax System Redesigned More Certain, Equitable and Durable 21
20 Dirkis 200 The Tax Specialist 18
21 Calculated as follows: [R500 (value in August 2005) + R50 (issue price of the shares issued to Beth)]/20 
(total number of SACo (Pty) Ltd shares) = R27,50 per share  The value of Adam’s shares thus decreased 
from R500 to R275, a decrease of R225  
existed, Adams would not be liable for CGT, since he had not realised any 
of his shares. The benefit is first one of timing: any capital gain would be 
deferred until Beth were to sell her shares in the future. A second benefit to the 
family is that any capital gain that Beth would make on a later realisation of 
her shares may be taxed at a lower tax rate than Adam would have been taxed 
at (for example because she is taxed at a lower marginal tax rate than Adam, or 
because of a reduction in the progressive tax rates in later years).
3	 	Integrating	the	value	shifting	anti-avoidance	measures	with	
the	general	CGT	regime
Whilst the need for value shifting anti-avoidance measures is apparent, the 
question as to how to integrate them with the general CGT regime has proven 
to be a real dilemma. The difficulty lies in the fact that a value shift does not fit 
the usual CGT mould of a capital gain arising on realisation of a CGT asset and 
the proceeds from the realisation exceeding the tax cost of the asset. In the case 
of value shifting, these elements are often not present. In the first place, no real-
isation takes place. Secondly, even if a value shift is deemed to be a realisation 
event, there is often no asset that is realised in terms of the deemed realisation 
and thus also no tax cost and market value (proceeds) that can be compared to 
calculate the capital gain or loss. The South African and Australian legislators 
have implemented different solutions to deal with these difficulties.
3 1 The South African approach
Under the Eighth Schedule, a capital gain only arises if a taxpayer disposes 
of an asset and the proceeds from that disposal exceed the base cost of the 
asset.22 There are thus three conditions that must be met before a capital gain 
arises: there must be a realisation event (a “disposal”), an asset must be real-
ised and the proceeds must be more than the base cost of the asset that was 
realised. The value shifting anti-avoidance measures, which has the objective 
of triggering CGT on the happening of a value shift, should thus meet each of 
these conditions.
3 1 1  Value shifting arrangements as “disposals”
The first condition is that a realisation event must take place. This condition 
is met, since a value shifting arrangement is expressly deemed to be a “dis-
posal”, which is defined as follows:
“[A] disposal is any event, act, forbearance or operation of law which results in the creation, varia-
tion, transfer or extinction of an asset, and includes—
(a) the sale, donation, expropriation, conversion, grant, cession, exchange or any other alienation or 
transfer of ownership of an asset;
(b) the forfeiture, termination, redemption, cancellation, surrender, discharge, relinquishment, 
release, waiver, renunciation, expiry or abandonment of an asset;
(c) the scrapping, loss, or destruction of an asset;
(d) the vesting of an interest in an asset of a trust in a beneficiary;
22 Par  of the Eighth Schedule
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(e) the distribution of an asset by a company to a shareholder;
(f) the granting, renewal, extension or exercise of an option; or
(g) the decrease in value of a person’s interest in a company, trust or partnership as a result of a 
value shifting arrangement.” 2 (emphasis added)
3 1 2  The “asset” that is disposed of in terms of a value shifting 
arrangement
The definition of a “disposal” in paragraph 11 also reiterates the second 
condition, namely that an asset must be the object of the disposal. It describes 
a “disposal” with reference to an “asset” that is “created”, “varied” or “trans-
ferred” or that becomes extinct. Except for sub-paragraphs (f) (which refers to 
an option, which is clearly an “asset”) and (g) (which deals with value shifting 
arrangements), all the other sub-paragraphs in the definition also incorporate 
the requirement that an “asset” must be the object of the disposal.
This begs the question of what constitutes the “asset” that is disposed of in 
the case of a value shifting arrangement. It seems from the wording of para-
graph 11(1)(g) that the legislator recognised the fact that no “asset”2 may be 
disposed of in the case of a value shifting arrangement.25 The sub-paragraph 
simply refers to the “value” that was shifted from the interest that decreased in 
value (the decreased interest or decreased share(s))2 and, since the value that 
was shifted is clearly neither property nor a right or interest in property, no 
“asset” is the object of, or deemed to be the object of, a disposal by way of a 
value shifting arrangement. It thus seems that the legislator intended for a dis-
posal by way of a value shifting arrangement to be an exception to the rule that 
a disposal must have an “asset” as its object.
However, a number of other provisions in the Eighth Schedule seem to 
imply that an “asset” is disposed of under a value shifting arrangement with-
out giving any clear indication of what such an asset may be. The first example 
of these provisions is paragraph 2(a). This provision deals, according to its 
heading, with the base cost of a value shifting arrangement. It lays down the 
formula for calculating “the base cost of a person’s interest to which paragraph 
11(1)(g) applies” (emphasis added). At first glance, this wording suggests that 
the formula determines the base cost of the decreased share. This in turn sug-
gests that the decreased share is regarded as the object of the disposal. How-
ever, such an interpretation is not supported by the formula that follows these 
words. This formula does not calculate the base cost of the decreased share, 
but rather that part of the base cost of the decreased share that can be attributed 
to the value that was shifted from the share. In light of the obvious rationale 
2 Par 11(1) of the Eighth Schedule
2 See the definition of “asset” in par 1 of the Eighth Schedule
25 There may be a number of examples of value shifting arrangements where an “asset” is in fact 
“disposed” of as contemplated in any one of the other subparagraphs of par 11(1)  However, these kinds 
of arrangements create fewer interpretational difficulties and are thus not specifically addressed in this 
article  See also n  infra regarding the view of the Australian Taxation Office and Australian authors 
regarding whether an “asset” can be said to be disposed of in the absence of specific value shifting anti-
avoidance measures
2 Division 725 of the 1997 ITAA uses the terminology of a “down interest”  The Eighth Schedule does not 
have any specific term for the interests that decrease in value due to the value shifting arrangement  
behind the formula, the phrase “the base cost of a person’s interest to which 
paragraph 11(1)(g) applies” should rather read “the base cost in respect of a 
value shifting arrangement” (as per the heading to paragraph 2). If read in this 
way, the provision is neutral as to whether or not an asset is disposed of under 
a value shifting arrangement and does not assist in solving the issue regarding 
what “asset”, if any, is regarded as the object of a disposal by way of a value 
shifting arrangement.
An equally perplexing provision is paragraph 20(h)(iv), which provides that 
“the base cost of an asset acquired by a person is the sum of … (h) in the case 
of … (iv) a value shifting arrangement, an amount determined in accordance 
with paragraph 2” (emphasis added). This subparagraph suggests that, in the 
case of a value shifting arrangement, the person whose interest in the company 
increased in value (the increased interest or the increased share(s))27 acquires 
an asset. Yet no mention is made as to what this asset may be.28
These provisions create a very confusing picture, which can be summarised 
as follows: paragraph  of the Eighth Schedule provides that a capital gain only 
arises on the disposal of an asset. However, paragraph 11(1)(g), which deems 
a value shifting arrangement to be a disposal, suggests that no asset is disposed 
of (or is deemed to be disposed of) and that value shifting arrangements are 
thus an exception to this rule. On the other hand, some of the general provi-
sions (such as paragraph 20(h)(iv)) and provisions that deal specifically with 
value shifting arrangements (such as paragraph 2(a)) suggest that some sort 
of asset is disposed of, without making it clear what that asset may be. Impor-
tantly, the Eighth Schedule does not explicitly deem a value shifting arrange-
ment to be a part disposal of the decreased share.
The failure by the South African legislator to deal consistently and compre-
hensively throughout the Eighth Schedule with the issues of whether “an asset” 
is disposed of (or is deemed to be disposed of), and if so, what that “asset” is 
(or is deemed to be), creates several interpretational difficulties, as highlighted 
in part  infra.
3 1 3   The base cost and proceeds in respect of a value shifting 
arrangement
The third condition that must be met before a capital gain arises is that the 
proceeds from the realisation event must exceed the base cost of the asset. 
However, since no asset may be disposed of in the case of a value shifting 
arrangement (see the discussion in part 3 1 2 supra), it would be impossible to 
determine the base cost of “the asset”. Also, the general rule to determine pro-
ceeds cannot be used for value shifting arrangements, since the holder of the 
decreased shares often does not become entitled to either money or property 
27 Division 725 of the 1997 ITAA uses the terminology of an “up interest”  The Eighth Schedule does not 
have any specific term for the interests that are issued at a discount or that increase in value due to the 
value shifting arrangement  
28 See also par 1(1) of the Eighth Schedule, which provides that the “time of disposal of an asset by means 
of…(f) the decrease of a person’s interest in a company…as a result of a value shifting arrangement” 
(emphasis added)
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from the value shift.29 For these reasons, special rules apply to determine the 
proceeds and base cost in the case of value shifting arrangements. There are 
also special rules for restoring distortions that may have been caused by the 
value shifting arrangement between the shares’ tax costs and market values. 
However, as will be seen in part   infra, these rules are incomplete.
3 2 The Australian approach
The tricky issue of how to integrate the value shifting provisions with 
the general CGT regime has also been troubling the Australian legislator 
for some time. The CGT regime was first introduced in Australia in the 
Australian Income Tax Assessment Act, 19 (the 19 ITAA). Similar to the 
Eighth Schedule, capital gains only arose under the CGT regime of the 19 
ITAA if a taxpayer disposed of an asset and the proceeds from the disposal 
exceeded the asset’s base cost.0 1 Over time the definition of “disposal” was 
extended to include transactions and events that went far beyond the traditional 
view of a “disposal” as a transfer of ownership of an asset.2 Due to considerable 
debate as to whether a value shift would fall within this extended definition, 
and more specifically whether it could be said that an asset is disposed of under 
a value shift, specific value shifting provisions were introduced in 1994. 
In terms of these provisions a value shift was explicitly deemed to be a part-
disposal of the decreased share5 and special rules were created to calculate the 
base cost of the part being disposed of and the proceeds arising from such part-
disposal. This approach thus ensured that all the conditions for the making of a 
capital gain were met, which in turn ensured that the value shifting provisions 
interacted well with the general CGT provisions.
A comparison between the integration approaches followed by the Eighth 
Schedule and the 1997 ITAA is more difficult, since the structures of their CGT 
regimes differ somewhat. Rather than having a central definition of a “dis-
posal”, the CGT regime of the 1997 ITAA contains several, separate realisation 
events, called “CGT events”. A taxpayer makes a capital gain (or loss) only if 
29 See par 5 of the Eighth Schedule
0 S 10AY of the 19 ITAA
1 The 1997 ITAA (like the 19 ITAA) adopts the terminology of “cost base” of a CGT asset and, in the 
case of Division 725, the “adjustable value” of an interest (as explained in s 725-20) and the “notional 
adjustable value” of a value shift  For the sake of simplicity, the terminology of the Eighth Schedule, that 
is the “base cost” of a CGT asset and the “base cost” in respect of a value shift, is used throughout the 
article, even when reference is made to the Australian tax legislation
2 Under s 10M of the 19 ITAA a change in beneficial ownership of an asset constituted a disposal  
However, several subsections in s 10M extended the definition of a “disposal” to also include other 
transactions and events  Some arrangements that were entered into before the introduction of Division 
19B (which dealt with share value shifting) might have been caught by the extended definition of a 
“disposal” in s 10M, as illustrated by Commissioner of Taxation TR94/30 Public Ruling (199)
 See, eg, Owen “The Capital Gains Tax Treatment of Share Value Shifting: Division 19B Under Scrutiny” 
1997 Australian Business LR 11 1 and Westbrook “Capital Gains Tax Implications of Variations of 
Rights Attaching to Shares” 199 Australian Tax Review 7  The view of the Australian Taxation Office, 
as expressed in TR94/30, was that, bar some very limited circumstances, it could not constitute either a 
disposal or a part-disposal of an asset and hence the need for specific value shifting provisions
 Division 19B of the 19 ITAA
5 See, eg, ss 10ZZRP and 10ZZRQ of the 19 ITAA
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a transaction fits into one of these CGT events. Each event lays down its own 
requirements (for example whether or not a “CGT asset” must be the object 
of the event), exceptions and the mechanism for calculating the capital gain or 
loss arising from that specific event. This new structure thus recognises the fact 
that it is extremely difficult to have only one, universal set of conditions that all 
transactions must meet before a CGT liability can arise.
CGT event K8 is the relevant CGT event that deals with share value shifts.7 
It does not set out the exact manner in which a capital gain arising from a value 
shift is to be calculated, but instead refers to Division 725.8 9 Division 725 then 
determines which kinds of value shifting will give rise to CGT, how the capital 
gain arising from these value shifts is to be calculated and which adjustments 
are to be made to the base costs of the shares involved in the value shift. Since 
there is no central requirement under this new regime that an “asset” be dis-
posed of for a capital gain to arise, the issue regarding what “asset” is being 
disposed of in the case of a value shifting arrangement generally does not arise. 
However, for some purposes (for example to give concessional treatment to 
value shifts involving shares acquired prior to 20 September 1985),0 the value 
shift is treated comparable with a part-disposal of the decreased share.1
4	 CGT	consequences	of	a	value	shift
As discussed in part 2 supra, value shifting anti-avoidance measures have 
two main objectives: to ensure that a value shift is treated as a realisation event 
that will trigger CGT and to restore any distortions that may have been caused 
by the value shift between the asset’s tax cost and market value. To meet these 
objectives, value shifting arrangements give rise to the following CGT con-
 S 102-20  S 10-5 contains a list of all the CGT events
7 S 10-250
8 Incidentally, Division 275 uses its own terminology, which differs from the terminology used in Part  of 
the 1997 ITAA (ie the part that deals with CGT), to determine the CGT consequences of a value shift  
9 The value shifting provisions were initially contained in Division 19B of the 19 ITAA  During the 
rewrite of the 19 ITAA under the Tax Law Improvement Project, Division 19B was rewritten as Division 
10 of the 1997 ITAA  See the Tax Law Improvement Act (No 1)  of 1998  (The Draft Comprehensive 
Guide to Capital Gains Tax n 2 still refers to this division)  Other value shifting rules were found in 
Divisions 18 (dealing with value shifting by asset stripping) and 19 (dealing with value shifting through 
debt forgiveness) of the 1997 ITAA, but these forms of value shifting are beyond the scope of this article  
In 1999, the Review of Business Taxation recommended a rewrite of the value shifting regime  The core 
provisions of the new value shifting regime, called the “General Value Shifting Regime”, were enacted by 
the New Business Tax System (Consolidation, Value Shifting, Demergers and Other Measures) Act 90 of 
2002 and special rules relating to the consolidation regime in Australia were enacted by the New Business 
Tax System (Consolidation and Other Measures) Act 1 of 200. The new regime is contained in three 
divisions: Division 725 (dealing with value shifting between equity and loan interests in unconsolidated 
companies and trusts), Division 72 (dealing with the realisation of a non-depreciating asset at a loss 
where the loss arose because of a right created over the asset in an associate and the market value of the 
right was not taxed in full on creation) and Division 727 (dealing with value shifting between entities in 
circumstances where they have not dealt at arm’s length and this impacts indirectly on the value of the 
interests held in those entities)  The forms of value shifting dealt with under the latter two Divisions are 
beyond the scope of this article  The General Value Shifting Regime applies generally to arrangements 
entered into after 1 July 2002  See s 725-1 in respect of value shifts that are governed by Division 725  See 
also Dirkis 200 The Tax Specialist 19
0 See part 5 2 infra for background on how shares acquired prior to 20 September 1985 are treated under 
the Australian CGT regime
1 See, eg, s 725-5 that refers to the value shift as a “partial realisation” (although the section does not 
indicate what the object of this partial realisation is)  See also s 725-20
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sequences under the Eighth Schedule: first, it is regarded as a disposal and 
will thus result in either a capital gain or loss for the taxpayer whose interest 
decreased in value;2 secondly, the base cost of the interest that increased in 
value, or that was obtained by the connected person as a result of the value 
shifting arrangement, is adjusted.Both these consequences are discussed 
below.
4 1  Calculating the capital gain or loss arising from a value shifting 
arrangement
The calculation of the capital gain (or loss) arising from a value shifting 
arrangement is governed by a set of special rules that determine the proceeds 
and base cost in respect of the value shifting arrangement. The proceeds are 
determined in terms of paragraph 35(2) and are defined as the market value of 
the decreased interest immediately prior to the value shifting arrangement, less 
its market value immediately thereafter: in other words, the proceeds are equal 
to the value that was shifted. The base cost is in turn calculated in accordance 
with the following formula in paragraph 2(a):
market value of the decreased interest immediately before 
the value shift – market value of the decreased interest 
immediately after the value shift
x
base cost of the 
decreased interest 
immediately before the 
value shiftmarket value of the decreased interest immediately before 
the value shift
The example in part 2 supra can be used to illustrate how a capital gain aris-
ing from a value shifting arrangement is calculated. The facts were as follows:5 
Adam incorporated SACo (Pty) Ltd in January 2002 with issued share capital 
of R200, consisting of ten ordinary shares. In August 2005, when the value of 
the shares had increased to R500, Adam arranged for SACo (Pty) Ltd to issue 
ten shares to his daughter Beth at a total subscription price of R50. Because 
of the discount at which the new shares were issued to Beth, the market value 
of Adam’s shares decreased to R275. Since this arrangement falls within the 
2 The time of the disposal is the date on which the decrease in value occurs  See par 1(1)(f) of the Eighth 
Schedule
 Par 2(b) of the Eighth Schedule
 The formula in paragraph 2(a) is:
          (A – C) “Y =              X  B
               A
 where–
 i)   ‘Y’ represents the amount to be determined;
 ii) ‘A’ is the market value of that person’s interests immediately prior to the disposal;
 iii)  ‘B’ is the person’s base cost of the interests calculated immediately prior to the disposal; and
 iv)    ‘C’ is the market value of that person’s interests immediately after the disposal ”
5 In all the examples used in the article, specific identification, as contemplated in par 2()(a) of the Eighth 
Schedule, is used to determine the base cost of the shares concerned  
 [R500 (value in August 2005) + R50 (issue price of the shares issued to Beth)]/20 = R27,50 per share  
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definition of a “value shifting arrangement”, Adam will realise a capital gain.7 
The gain, which amounts to R15, is calculated as follows:
Step 1: Calculate Adam’s proceeds in respect of the value shift:8 market value of the decreased shares 
immediately prior to the value shift – market value of the decreased shares immediately after the value 
shift
= R500 – R275 = R225
Step 2: Calculate Adam’s base cost in respect of the value shift:
market value of the decreased shares immediately before the value shift – 
market value of the decreased shares immediately after the value shift
x
base cost of the 
decreased shares 
immediately 
before the value 
shiftmarket value of decreased shares immediately before the value shift
        R500 – R275
=                         X  R200 = R90
       R500
Step : Calculate Adam’s capital gain from the value shift:
Proceeds – base cost = R225 – R90 = R15
4 1 1 Decreased shares acquired before 1 October 2001
The application of these special rules is problematic in those cases where the 
decreased shares are pre-valuation date assets (pre-CGT assets).9 Generally, if 
pre-CGT assets are disposed of, the tax cost of these assets are adjusted so that 
(at least in theory) only increases in the value of these assets after 1 October 
2001 are subject to CGT. The adjustments are set out in paragraphs 25 to 28 
of the Eighth Schedule. Paragraph 25(1) provides that the base cost of a pre-
CGT asset is the sum of the value of the pre-CGT asset on 1 October 2001 and 
expenditure incurred on/after 1 October 2001. The 1 October value is deter-
mined in terms of paragraphs 2 to 28. Paragraph 2(1) provides that:
“Where the proceeds from the disposal of a pre-valuation date asset … exceed the expenditure allow-
able in terms of paragraph 20 … the person who disposed of that asset must … adopt any of the fol-
lowing as the valuation date value of that asset…” (emphasis added).50
Paragraph 2 thus presupposes that all disposals will involve the disposal of 
an asset. However, as discussed in part 3 1 2 supra, in the case of a value shift-
ing arrangement, no asset may be disposed of and the Eighth Schedule does 
not give any clear indication that any asset is deemed to be disposed of. A strict 
reading of paragraph 2 would mean that, if value is shifted from a pre-CGT 
share, paragraph 2 cannot apply to the calculation of the base cost of the value 
7 See par 1 of the Eighth Schedule and the discussion on the definition of a “value shifting arrangement” in 
part 2 supra
8 For the sake of simplicity only, all the calculations in this article are done on a collective basis, ie by 
grouping together all the decreased and increased interests respectively
9 A “pre-valuation date asset” is defined in par 1 of the Eighth Schedule as “an asset acquired prior to 
valuation date [1 October 2001] by a person and which has not been disposed of by that person before 
valuation date”
50 Par 27 has similar wording  Par 28 is not relevant
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shifting arrangement in terms of paragraph 2(a), since no “pre-valuation date 
asset” (emphasis added) is disposed of. This clearly goes against the objective 
of paragraphs 25 to 28: since some of the value that has been shifted under the 
value shifting arrangement relates to the period before 1 October 2001, the 
value shifted cannot be taxed in full. This is the first of a number of examples 
that illustrates the problems that arise from the fact that no “asset” has been 
identified as the object of the disposal by way of a value shifting arrangement. 
A solution to this problem will be to adopt a similar approach to the 19 ITAA 
and to deem a value shift to be a part-disposal of the decreased share. If done 
in this way, it will be clear that paragraph 2 can apply in those cases where 
value has been shifted from pre-CGT decreased shares to adjust the base cost 
in respect of the value shift.51
This is not the only problem that arises if the decreased shares are pre-CGT 
assets. Further problems ensue if (despite the interpretational problem high-
lighted above) one attempts to use the methods prescribed in paragraph 2 to 
calculate the base cost in respect of the value shifting arrangement. To recap, 
the formula for the calculation of the base cost in respect of a value shifting 
arrangement is as follows:52
market value of the decreased interest immediately before the value 
shift – market value of the decreased interest immediately after the 
value shift
x




the value shiftmarket value of the decreased interest immediately before the value 
shift
Say the taxpayer elects to adopt the time-apportionment method to deter-
mine the base cost in respect of the value shifting arrangement.5 How is this 
method applied to the above formula? The only part of the formula in para-
graph 2(a) to which the time-apportionment method can apply is the “base 
cost of the decreased interest immediately before the value shift”. The relevant 
formula5 for the time-apportionment method is:55
51 Amendments to par 2 will be required too  Eg, the reference to “expenditure allowable in terms of 
paragraph 20” will have to be broadened to include a reference to par 2(a)
52 Par 2(a) of the Eighth Schedule
5 Whether the time-apportionment method will be available, will depend on a number of circumstances  A 
detailed discussion of these rules is beyond the scope of this article
5 Different time-apportionment formulae may apply, depending on the circumstances  For the sake of 
complicity, the formula in n 55 infra is used here
55 Par 0(1)  The formula is as follows:
                 (P - B) X N “Y = B +                    
                    T + N
 “Where–
 a) ‘Y’ represents the amount to be determined;
 b)  ‘B’ represents the amount of expenditure … in respect of that asset that is attributable to the period-
from the date that the asset was acquired to [0 September 2001];
 c)  ‘P’ represents the proceeds … in respect of the disposal of that asset…;
 d)  ‘N’ represents the number of years determined from the date that the asset was acquired to [0 
September 2001] [to a maximum of 20 years in certain cases] …;
 e)  ‘T’ represents the number of years determined from [1 October 2001] until the date the asset was 
disposed of after [1 October 2001]…
 Provided that for purposes of items (d) and (e) a part of a year must be treated as a full year ”
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pre-1/10/2001 expenses +
(proceeds – pre-1/10/2001 expenses) x number of years asset 
was held before 1/10/2001
sum of number of years asset was held before and after 
1/10/2001 respectively
“Proceeds” will presumably only include the proceeds in respect of the 
value shifting arrangement, since this is the only proceeds that are known at 
that stage. Clearly then, “pre-1/10/2001 expenses” cannot include the entire 
cost of the decreased share. A common-sense solution would be to include only 
a portion of the cost in the time-apportionment formula. This portion can be 
calculated by reference to that portion of the value of the decreased share that 
is being shifted.5
This common-sense approach can be illustrated by way of the following 
example: Adam incorporated SACo (Pty) Ltd in January 2001 with issued 
share capital of R200, consisting of ten ordinary shares. In August 2005, when 
the value of the shares had increased to R500, Adam arranged for SACo (Pty) 
Ltd to issue ten shares to his daughter Beth at a total subscription price of R50. 
Because of the discount at which the new shares were issued to Beth, the mar-
ket value of Adam’s shares decreased to R275.57 Adam elected the time-appor-
tionment method to calculate the base cost of the value shifting arrangement. 
He realises a capital gain of R108, calculated as follows:
Step 1: Calculate Adam’s proceeds in respect of the value shifting arrangement:
market value of the decreased shares immediately prior to the value shift – market value of the decreased 
shares immediately after the value shift
= R500 – R275 = R225
Step 2: Calculate Adam’s base cost for the value shifting arrangement:
Step 2(a): Calculate the portion of the value of the shares that was shifted:
market value of the decreased shares immediately before the value shift – market value of the 
decreased shares immediately after the value shift
market value of decreased shares immediately before the value shift
        500 – 275
=                       =  0.5
       500
Step 2(b): Apply this portion to the expenses incurred in respect of the decreased shares before 1 Octo-
ber 2001:
R200 x 0.5 = R90
Step 2(c): Calculate the time-apportionment base cost in respect of the value shifting arrangement:
5 Incidentally, this is the method prescribed in the Draft Comprehensive Guide to Capital Gains Tax 
example 2 par 8 27 2 for calculating the time-apportionment base cost in respect of part-disposals of pre-
CGT assets
57 [R500 (value in August 2005) + R50 (issue price of the shares issued to Beth)]/20 = R27,50 per share
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pre-1/10/2001 expenses +
(proceeds – pre-1/10/2001 expenses) x number of years asset 
was held before 1/10/2001
sum of number of years asset was held before and after 
1/10/2001 respectively
                   (R225 – R90) x 1
= R90 +                                 =  R117
                     1 + 
Step : Calculate Adam’s capital gain from the value shifting arrangement:
Proceeds – base cost = R225 – R117 = R108
This approach seems to generate a reasonable answer.58 It is, however, not 
supported by the actual wording of paragraph 2(a), since it merges the calcu-
lation of the base cost of the decreased interest with the calculation of the por-
tion of the value of the decreased share that was shifted, whereas the formula 
in paragraph 2(a) requires that these two components of the calculation of the 
base cost in respect of the value shifting arrangement are calculated separately. 
This is another example of the problems that arise from the failure to ensure 
that the specialised value shifting rules are compatible with the general provi-
sions of the Eighth Schedule.
4 1 2  Capital losses arising from value shifting arrangements
Interestingly, a value shifting arrangement under the Eighth Schedule can 
give rise to a capital loss.59 The following example illustrates how such a loss 
may come about: Adam incorporated SACo (Pty) Ltd in January 2002 with 
issued share capital of R700, consisting of ten ordinary shares. In August 2005, 
when the value of the shares had decreased to R500, Adam arranged for SACo 
(Pty) Ltd to issue ten shares to his daughter Beth at a total subscription price 
of R50. Because of the discount at which the new shares were issued to Beth, 
the market value of Adam’s shares decreased to R275.0 This is clearly a value 
shifting arrangement, since Adam retained his shares in SACo (Pty) Ltd, but 
following the issue of shares to a connected person in relation to him (Beth), 
the value of his shares decreased and Beth obtained an interest in SACo (Pty) 
Ltd. Adam will make a capital loss of R90, calculated as follows:
Step 1: Calculate Adam’s proceeds in respect of the value shifting arrangement:
market value of the decreased shares immediately prior to the value shift – market value of the decreased 
shares immediately after the value shift
= R500 – R275 = R225
Step 2: Calculate Adam’s base cost in respect of the value shifting arrangement:
58 The total increase in value of Adam’s shares before the value shifting arrangement was R00  Of this, 
R20 (or /5 of R00) is assumed to relate to the period on/after 1 October 2001 and should thus be subject 
to CGT at some stage  Due to the value shift, Adam transferred 0 5 of the value of his shares, resulting 
in a capital gain of 0 5 x R20 = R108 from the value shift  If he sold his shares immediately thereafter, 
the remaining R12 (R20 – R108) would have been subject to CGT
59 Capital losses from share value shifting are disregarded in Australia  See s 10-250()  See also A Tax 
System Redesigned More Certain, Equitable and Durable 2 and A Platform for Consultation Discussion 
Paper 2 Building on a Strong Foundation 20 where the reasons for the Australian position are briefly 
mentioned
0 [R500 (value in August 2005) + R50 (issue price of the shares issued to Beth)]/20 = R27,50 per share
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market value of the decreased shares immediately before the value shift 
– market value of the decreased shares immediately after the value shift
x
base cost of the 
decreased shares 
immediately 
before the value 
shift
market value of decreased shares immediately before the value shift
        R500 – R275
=                          x R700 = R15
       R500
Step : Calculate Adam’s capital loss from the value shift:
Proceeds – base cost = R225 – R15 = (R90)
A question which arises in this context is whether Adam’s loss will be “ring-
fenced” or “clogged” under paragraph 9. This provision determines that a tax-
payer must disregard any capital loss in respect of the “disposal of an asset” to 
a connected person, except insofar as such loss may be off-set against capital 
gains made from future transactions with the same connected person: in other 
words, the loss is “clogged” or “ring-fenced”. This provision thus presupposes 
the existence of an asset, which is disposed of to a connected person. However, 
as discussed in part 3 1 2 supra, value shifting arrangements may not involve 
the disposal of an “asset”, and the Eighth Schedule also does not give a clear 
indication that any asset is deemed to be disposed of. On a strict interpretation 
of paragraph 9, the transfer of value to a connected person will thus not be 
ring-fenced. Such an interpretation would clearly go against the objective of 
the provision and may encourage taxpayers to use value shifting rather than 
conventional ways of realising their shares since the former will not give rise 
to clogged losses, whilst the latter will. Again, this issue arises due to the fail-
ure to integrate properly the value shifting provisions with the general CGT 
regime that requires an asset to be the object of a disposal. The solution pro-
posed to the issue in part 4 1 1 supra, namely to treat a value shifting arrange-
ment explicitly as a part-disposal of the decreased share, could also provide a 
solution for this issue.
4 2 Adjusting the base cost of the interest that increased in value
The second consequence of a value shifting arrangement is that the base cost 
of the increased share is lifted. This is necessary to avoid the increase in value, 
which is taxed in the hands of the holder of the decreased interest under the 
value shifting provisions, from being taxed again in the hands of the holder of 
the increased interest on realisation of that interest.
According to paragraph 2(b), the base cost of the increased interest is to be 
lifted by either of the following amounts:
“(i) that proportion of the proceeds on disposal contemplated in paragraph 5(2) in respect of the 
value shifting arrangement which resulted in the increase in market value of [the connected per-
son’s] interest; or
(ii) that proportion of the proceeds on disposal contemplated in paragraph 5(2) in respect of 
the value shifting arrangement which resulted in the acquisition of [the connected person’s] 
interest”.
The drafting of paragraph 2(b)(ii) is rather clumsy. The words “that pro-
portion of the proceeds…which resulted in the acquisition [of the connected 
person’s interest]” (emphasis added) suggest that there must be a causal link 
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between the proceeds (in other words the value that was shifted from the 
decreased interest) and the acquisition of the increased interest. One would 
rather expect paragraph 2(b)(ii) to require a causal link between the proceeds 
(that is the value shifted) and the discount at which the decreased interest 
was acquired by the connected person, in the same way as paragraph 2(b)(i) 
requires a causal link between the proceeds and the uplift in value of the 
increased interests.
The uplift in the base cost of the increased interest can be illustrated by the 
example used in part  1 supra. The facts were as follows: Adam incorporated 
SACo (Pty) Ltd in January 2002 with issued share capital of R200, consist-
ing of ten ordinary shares. In August 2005, when the value of the shares had 
increased to R500, Adam arranged for SACo (Pty) Ltd to issue ten shares to 
his daughter Beth at a total subscription price of R50. In terms of paragraph 
2(b), Beth’s base cost is to be increased by that proportion of the proceeds in 
respect of the value shifting arrangement that is attributable to the discount at 
which the new shares were issued to Beth, being R225. This restores the bal-
ance between the tax cost and market value of her shares, since the new base 
cost of her shares is equal to their market value immediately after the value 
shift. Should Beth in future sell her shares, she will only be subject to CGT on 
a subsequent increase in the value of the shares.
Paragraph 2(b) clearly makes provision for an apportionment if the entire 
proceeds in respect of the value shifting arrangement did not give rise to the 
increase in the market value of the increased interest or to the discount at 
which the shares were issued. This is because of the reference to “that pro-
portion of the proceeds…which resulted in [the increase in the market value 
of the increased interest or in the discount at which the new shares were 
issued]” (emphasis added). No formula is provided for the apportionment 
and presumably any fair allocation will be acceptable. The formula provided 
in the 1997 ITAA for calculating the uplift in the base cost of the increased 
interest is more prescriptive regarding how such an apportionment should be 
made:1
increase in the market value of the increased shares of, or discounts 
given to, the connected person
x
decrease in the 
market value of the 
decreased shareseither of:
•    if the decrease in the market value of the decreased shares ≥ the 
increase in the market value of the decreased shares: the decrease 
in the market value
•    otherwise: the increase in the market value of the increased shares 
and/or discounts given
The allocation prescribed by the formula thus makes provision for inter alia 
the following contingencies: first, where value has been shifted to both con-
nected and non-connected persons, only value that has been shifted to the con-
nected person is included in his or her base cost for the increased interest. 
Secondly, to the extent that the reduction in value of the decreased interest is 
1 This is an adaptation of several formulae in s 725-75 of the 1997 ITAA  Furthermore, different formulae 
may apply depending on the kind of value shift that took place
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not reflected in the increased value of the increased interest (or in the discount 
at which shares were issued), only the part of the reduction in value of the 
decreased interest which is reflected in the value of the increased interest (or 
in the discount given) is included in the base cost of the increased interest of 
the connected person. This may, for example, happen if value is shifted from a 
majority to a minority holding and the minority holding is worth less per share 
than the majority holding.
4 3 Adjusting  the base cost of the decreased interest
There is a curious oversight in the Eighth Schedule. It contains no special 
rule to adjust the base cost of the decreased interest because of the value that 
was shifted from that interest. As a result, a portion of the base cost of the 
decreased interest will be allowed as a deduction twice: first in calculating the 
capital gain in respect of the value shifting arrangement, and secondly in cal-
culating the capital gain on realisation of the decreased interest.
This oversight is illustrated by the example of Adam and Beth in part  1 
supra. It will be recalled that Adam incorporated SACo (Pty) Ltd in Janu-
ary 2002 with issued share capital of R200, consisting of ten ordinary shares. 
In August 2005, when the value of the shares had increased to R500, Adam 
arranged for SACo (Pty) Ltd to issue ten shares to his daughter Beth at a 
total subscription price of R50. Adam’s capital gain from this value shifting 
arrangement was R15. If Adam were to sell his shares shortly thereafter at 
their market value of R275,2 the capital gain from the sale will be calculated 
as follows:
Step 1: Calculate Adam’s proceeds in respect of the sale of his shares:
Money received on sale of the shares: R275
Step 2: Calculate Adam’s base cost in respect of his shares:
Since no special adjustment is made, the ordinary rules apply and his base cost is R200, namely the 
subscription price of the shares.
Step : Calculate Adam’s capital gain from the sale:
Proceeds – base cost = R275 – R200 = R75
Adam’s total capital gain is thus R15 (from the value shifting arrangement) 
+ R75 (from the subsequent disposal of his shares) = R210, even though the 
increase in value of his shares before the value shift was R00. Furthermore, 
if Beth were to sell her shares at the same time, she will not be liable for any 
CGT, since her base cost was increased by the amount of value that was shifted 
to her shares, as was discussed in part  2 supra. Only a portion (R210) of 
the real increase in value (R00) is thus taxed. To achieve the right outcome, 
namely that the full increase in the value of the shares (R00) is taxed, Adam’s 
base cost in respect of his shares should have been reduced by the amount 
that was taken into account as the base cost of the value shifting arrangement 
(R90). That would have resulted in a capital gain from the sale of his shares of 
2 [R500 (value in August 2005) + R50 (issue price of the shares issued to Beth)]/20 = R27,50 per share
 These rules are contained in par 20 of the Eighth Schedule
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R15 and his total capital gain would have been R15 (from the value shift) + 
R15 (from the subsequent disposal of his shares) = R00.
As mentioned, there is no special rule that adjusts the base cost of the 
decreased share. There is also no general CGT provision that performs this 
function. In the first place, since a value shifting arrangement is not deemed 
to be a part-disposal of the decreased interest, as was discussed in part  1 
supra, one cannot argue that the base cost of the decreased interest should be 
decreased because a part thereof has been disposed of. Furthermore, paragraph 
21 (the general provision that guards against double deduction of expenses) is 
unlikely to apply. Paragraph 21 reads as follows:
“(1)  Where, but for the provisions of this subparagraph, an amount qualifies or has qualified as an 
allowable expenditure or may otherwise being taken into account in determining a capital gain 
or capital loss under more than one provision of this Schedule, that amount or portion thereof, 
shall not be allowed as expenditure or be taken into account more than once in determining that 
capital gain or capital loss.
(2) No expenditure shall be allowed under paragraph 20(1)(a) or (e) where any amount of that 
expenditure is allowable under any other provision of this Schedule, despite that that other pro-
vision imposes any limitation on the amount of the expenditure.” (emphasis added)
Paragraph 21(1) foresees the situation where the same event or transaction 
results in the base cost (or part thereof) being taken into account twice in cal-
culating the capital gain (or loss) arising from that event or transaction. In the 
case of a value shifting arrangement, the value shift and subsequent disposal 
of the decreased shares are different events, happening at different times, and 
paragraph 21(1) thus does not apply.
Paragraph 21(2) governs the situation where expenditure could be included 
in the base cost of an asset under more than one provision, but the amount of 
the expenditure that can be so included is limited under one of these provisions. 
In such a case, only the amount determined by the provision that imposes the 
limit can be included in the base cost of the asset. This clearly does not apply 
to value shifting arrangements, since neither paragraph 2(a), nor any other 
provision imposes a limit on the expenditure that can be claimed as the base 
cost of the decreased interest on its subsequent disposal.
The oversight of not adjusting the base cost of the decreased interest is espe-
cially curious in light of the fact that a comparison with the Australian value 
shifting regimes under both the 19 ITAA and 1997 ITAA would have high-
lighted the need for a special rule governing the reduction in the base cost of 
the decreased interest.5 Until such time as this oversight is remedied, there is 
still a real advantage for taxpayers to use value shifting to reduce their CGT 
liability. In remedying this oversight, special attention will have to be paid to 
the question of how to adjust the base cost of pre-CGT decreased shares. Rules 
similar to those adopted in paragraphs (1)(b) and (5) of the Eighth Sched-
ule will be required.
 These views regarding the scope of par 21 correspond with the views of the South African Revenue 
Service  See the Draft Comprehensive Guide to Capital Gains Tax 1
5 Both the 19 ITAA and 1997 ITAA have such special rules  See, eg, ss 10ZZRP() and 10ZZRQ() of 
the 19 ITAA and item  of the table in ss 725-250(2) and 725-5 of the 1997 ITAA
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5	 Value	shifting	between	assets	held	by	the	same	taxpayer
In this part of the article, it will be argued that the scope of the South African 
value shifting anti-avoidance measures is too narrow in that they fail to recognise 
the fact that value shifting may take place not only between shares held by differ-
ent taxpayers, but also between shares held by the same taxpayer. Where value is 
shifted between shares of different taxpayers, the economic effect is comparable 
with that of a sale and transfer of the shares (or rather parts thereof). That is why, 
as was discussed in part 2 supra, one of the objectives of value shifting anti-
avoidance measures is to treat this kind of value shifting as a trigger event for 
CGT: in other words, it is as if the shares (or rather parts thereof) were sold and 
transferred. Where value is shifted between shares owned by the same taxpayer, 
the economic effect is different. In such a case, value is not transferred to a dif-
ferent taxpayer and there is thus no need to treat the value shift as if the shares (of 
rather parts thereof) were sold. Nevertheless, such a value shift creates a distor-
tion between the tax costs and market values of the shares involved, which could 
lead to tax avoidance on a later realisation of the shares.
Below, two examples of this kind of value shifting, namely between shares 
held by the same taxpayer, are looked at. These two examples are not recog-
nised as forms of tax avoidance by the South African value shifting anti-avoid-
ance measures, but are recognised as such by the Australian anti-avoidance 
measures.
5 1 Value shifting between post-CGT shares
The first example of a value shift between assets held by the same taxpayer, 
is between shares acquired on/after 1 October 2001 (post-CGT shares) that are 
owned by the same person. The following example illustrates this kind of value 
shifting and the distortion that it creates: Xavier incorporated Company (Pty) 
Ltd (Company) in January 2002 with issued share capital of R200, consisting 
of ten ordinary shares (the initial shares). In August 2005, when the value of 
the shares had increased to R500 (that is R50 per share), Xavier arranged for 
Company to issue another ten shares (the subsequent shares) to him at a total 
subscription price of R50 (that is R5 per share). In December 2005 Xavier sold 
the initial shares to a non-related third party at market value (R275).7
This arrangement is not a “value shifting arrangement” for a number of 
reasons, two of which are mentioned here. First, in order for an arrangement 
to constitute a “value shifting arrangement”, the reduction in the market value 
of the decreased interest must “follow” a change in the rights and entitlements 
of the taxpayer’s interests in the company: in other words, there must be a 
causal link between a change in the rights or entitlements of the taxpayer and a 
decrease in the value of his or her shares.8 In the example above, it is clear that 
the value of Xavier’s initial shares decreased due to the issue of the subsequent 
 As mentioned in part 1 supra, s 10 (now s 80A-80L of the Income Tax Act 58 of 192) may apply in these 
cases, but is beyond the scope of this article
7 [R500 (value of the initial shares in August 2005) + R50 (issue price of the subsequent shares)]/20 = 
R27,50 per share
8 See n 8 supra
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shares at a discount. However, the issue of the subsequent shares were not the 
result of a change in the rights and entitlements in Company: Xavier had the 
same rights and entitlements relating to the receipt of dividends, voting, etc 
in Company before and after the issue of the subsequent shares. The required 
causal link between a change in the rights and entitlements of the company and 
the decrease in value of the initial shares is thus not present. Secondly, the third 
party is not a connected person in relation to Xavier and neither (a) nor (b) of 
the definition of a “value shifting arrangement” is thus met.
In the example, Xavier will make a capital gain of R75.9 Compare this with 
the capital gain he would have made, had he sold 50% of his interest in Com-
pany to the third party without arranging for the issue of the subsequent shares. 
In such an event, he would have made a capital gain of R150 in respect of the 
sale of five of the initial shares.70 By first transferring value from the initial 
shares to the subsequent shares, Xavier had thus created a distortion between 
the tax cost and market value of the initial shares and so secured a tax benefit (a 
deferral of a portion of his capital gain until such time as the subsequent shares 
are sold) on the sale of the initial shares.
The value shifting anti-avoidance measures of the 1997 ITAA reduce, but do 
not eliminate this kind of tax avoidance. In recognition of the fact that the eco-
nomic effect of this kind of value shifting is different from that of value shift-
ing between assets held by different taxpayers (which has the same economic 
effect as a sale and transfer), it is not deemed to be a realisation event for CGT 
purposes. 71 Instead, the only consequence is an adjustment to the base costs of 
the decreased and increased shares. 72 7 The adjustments that are made under 
the 1997 ITAA are illustrated by the following example, assuming the same 
facts as in Xavier’s example above:




– [ x cost of the initial shares ]market value of the initial shares 
immediately before the value shift
 Value shifted75
                          R225
= R200 – [             x R200 ] = R200 – R90 = R110                 R500
9 Proceeds – base cost = R275 – R200 = R75
70 Proceeds – base cost = R250 – R100 = R150
71 See the list of events that are regarded as realisation events for CGT purposes in s 725-25  
72 See item 1 of the table in s 725-250(2) for the adjustments to be made to the base costs of the decreased 
and increased shares
7 For a discussion of the purpose of corresponding provisions in the now repealed Division 19B of the 19 
ITAA, refer to Owen 1997 Australian Business LR 170 17  According to Owen, the purpose of these 
provisions are to make these kinds of value shifts “CGT neutral”, in that the taxpayer should be liable for 
the same total CGT, irrespective of whether the value shift has taken place or not  It does not, however, 
prevent a taxpayer from deferring the recognition of capital gains until a later time  
7 The formula in the example is a simplified version of the one in s 725-5
75 R500 (value of the initial shares immediately before the issue of the subsequent shares) – R275 (value of 
the initial shares after the issue of the subsequent shares) = R225
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Step 2: Calculate the new base cost of the increased shares (the subsequent shares):7
cost of the 
subsequent 
shares 
+ [ Value shifted x cost of the initial shares ]market value of the initial shares 
immediately before the value shift
                          R225
= R50 – [              x R200 ] = R50 + R90 = R10                 R500
If Xavier were to sell the subsequent shares to the non-related third party, he 
will make a capital gain of R135, which is the difference between his proceeds 
(R275) and the base cost of the subsequent shares, as calculated in step 2 supra 
(R10).77 If one compares this with the R75 capital gain he would have made 
under the Eighth Schedule, it is clear that he does not get the same tax deferral 
benefit that is currently available in terms of the Eighth Schedule.
5 2 Value shifting between pre- and post-CGT shares
A second example of value shifting between assets held by the same tax-
payer is between pre- and post-CGT shares held by the same person. If value is 
shifted from the post- to the pre-CGT shares, the value of the pre-CGT shares 
is increased and the taxpayer can take advantage of the special rules in para-
graphs 25 to 28 of the Eighth Schedule to obtain a higher base cost for the 
value that was shifted. Importantly, this kind of arrangement does not give a 
mere timing advantage. It results in a permanent reduction in CGT.
This is illustrated by the following example: Yvonne incorporated YCo (Pty) 
Ltd (YCo) in January 2000 with issued share capital of R5, consisting of one 
ordinary share (the original share). In January 2002, when the value of the 
original share had increased to R20, Yvonne subscribed to a further ordinary 
share (the later share) in YCo at a subscription price of R20. By August 2002 
the value of the shares had increased to R50 per share (that is R100 in total). 
At that stage, Yvonne arranged for YCo to change the share rights attaching to 
the later share. This caused the value of the later share to decline to R25 and 
the value of the original share to increase to R75. In September 2002, while 
the values of the shares were still R25 and R75 respectively, Yvonne sold her 
shares to an unrelated third party.
This does not constitute a value shifting arrangement for two reasons: first, 
although the market value of Yvonne’s interests (the later share) decreased 
because of the change in the share rights of the later share, it cannot be said 
that the third party obtained an interest in YCo because of this change78 and, 
secondly, the third party is not a connected person in relation to Yvonne.
7 The formula in the example is a simplified version of the one in s 725-70
77 In Australia, Adam would rather sell the subsequent shares first, since they have a higher base cost  If 
Adam were to sell the initial shares thereafter, and assuming no increase in the value of these shares since 
August 2005, he will make a capital gain of R15 that is the difference between his proceeds (R275) and 
the base cost of the initial shares as calculated in step 1 (R110)  His total capital gain from the sale of both 
batches of shares will thus be R00, which is equal to the increase in the value of the initial shares prior 
to the value shift
78 See n 9 supra
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Yvonne will make a capital gain of R28,33 in respect of the sale of her 
shares, calculated as follows:
Step 1: Calculate Yvonne’s capital gain in respect of the sale of the decreased share (the later share): 
Proceeds: R25 
Base cost: R20 
Capital gain (proceeds – base cost): R5
Step 2: Calculate Yvonne’s capital gain in respect of the sale of the increased share (the original share):
Proceeds: R75
Base cost: Assume Yvonne elected the time-apportionment method:
pre-1/10/2001 
expenses +
(proceeds – pre-1/10/2001 expenses) x number of years asset was held 
before 1/10/2001
sum of number of years asset was held before and after 1/10/2001 
respectively
                (R75 – R5) x 2
= R5 +                             = R51,7
                2 + 1
Capital gain (proceeds – base cost): R75 – R51,7 = R2,
Step : Calculate Yvonne’s total capital gain:
Capital gain from the sale of the later share: R5
Capital gain from the sale of the original share: R2,
Total capital gain: R28,
On the other hand, if Yvonne had not arranged for the change in the share 
rights, her capital gain would have been R45, calculated as follows:
Step 1: Calculate Yvonne’s capital gain in respect of the sale of the decreased share (the later share):
Proceeds: R50
Base cost: R20
Capital gain (proceeds – base cost): R0
Step 2: Calculate Yvonne’s capital gain in respect of the sale of the increased share (the original share):
Proceeds: R50
Base cost: Assume Yvonne elected the time-apportionment method:
pre-1/10/2001 expenses +
(proceeds – pre-1/10/2001 expenses) x number of years asset 
was held before 1/10/2001
sum of number of years asset was held before and after 
1/10/2001 respectively
                (R50 – R5) x 2
= R5 +                             = R5
                2 + 1
Capital gain (proceeds – base cost): R50 – R5 = R15
Step : Calculate Yvonne’s total capital gain
Capital gain from the sale of the later share: R0
Capital gain from the sale of the original share: R15
Total capital gain: R5
By changing the share rights in order to shift value from her post-CGT share 
(the later share) to her pre-CGT share (the original share), Yvonne had thus 
reduced her capital gain.
Value shifting from post- to pre-CGT assets could have held even more sig-
nificant tax benefits for Australian taxpayers. That is because a taxpayer under 
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the Australian CGT regime only makes a capital gain (or loss) if he or she 
realises79 an asset that was acquired after 19 September 1985, the date from 
which CGT became operative in Australia (post-CGT assets),80 subject to a 
number of exceptions: in other words, if the taxpayer realises an asset that was 
acquired before 20 September 1985 (pre-CGT assets ), no CGT liability arises. 
If taxpayers could thus shift value from post-CGT to pre-CGT shares and sub-
sequently sell the pre-CGT shares, no CGT would have arisen on the value 
that was so shifted. To counter this, the value shifting anti-avoidance measures 
have been drafted in such a way as to include value shifting from post- to pre-
CGT shares.81 The consequences of such a shift are: the holder of the shares is 
taxed on the value shifted from the post-CGT share to the pre-CGT share,82 the 
base cost of the post-CGT share is reduced by the value shifted8 and the base 
cost of the pre-CGT share is increased.8 The effect is thus that the value shift 
is treated similarly to a part-disposal of the post-CGT share.
If the Australian approach is applied to Yvonne’s example, with the neces-
sary changes to take into account the differences between the South African 
and Australian legislation in respect of the calculation of the base cost of pre-
CGT shares, the result is as follows:
Step 1: Calculate Yvonne’s capital gain in respect of the value shift (namely the change in the share rights 
of the later share)85
Step 1(a): Calculate the proceeds in respect of the value shift:
market value of the later share immediately prior to the value shift – market value of the later share imme-
diately after the value shift
= R50 – R25 = R25
Step 1(b): Calculate the base cost in respect of the value shift:
x
base cost of the later 
share immediately before 
the value shiftmarket value of the later share immediately before the value shift
                             Value shifted8
  
      R25=            x R20 = R10
  R50
Step 1(c): Calculate the capital gain from the value shift:
proceeds – base cost
= R25 – R10 = R15
79 In other words, if the transaction or event is one of the CGT events listed in s 10-5  
80 See, eg, s 100-25
81 Value shifting from pre- to post-CGT shares will also have consequences under the 1997 ITAA  In such a 
case, the value shifting is not treated as a realisation event, but adjustments are made to the base costs of 
the decreased and increased interests  See item  of the table in s 725-250  
82 Item 1 of the table in ss 725-25 and 725-5
8 Item  of the table in ss 725-250(2) and 725-5
8 Item  of the table in ss 725-250(2) and 725-75  Although, generally speaking, subsequent disposals of 
pre-CGT shares do not give rise to capital gains or losses, the base cost of pre-CGT shares is important 
for some provisions in the 1997 ITAA
85 This is a simplified version of the method statement in s 725-5
8 R50 (the value of the later share immediately before the change in the share rights) – R25 (the value of the 
later share immediately after the change in the share rights) = R25
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Step 2: Adjust the base cost of the decreased share (the later share):87
Cost of the later share – base cost in respect of the value shift (see step 1(b) supra)
= R20 – R10 = R10
Step : Adjust the base cost of the increased share (the original share): (This step can only be taken once 
the original share has been sold (see step 5 infra) since the “proceeds” in the formula will only be known 
at that stage.)
Cost of the original share + value shifted = R5 + R25 = R088
Apply the time-apportionment method:
pre-1/10/2001 expenses +
(proceeds – pre-1/10/2001 expenses) x number of years asset 
was held before 1/10/2001
sum of number of years asset was held before and after 
1/10/2001 respectively
    (R75 – R30) x 2
    
                          
= R0 +         2 + 1              = R0
Step : Calculate Yvonne’s capital gain in respect of the sale of the decreased share (the later share):
Proceeds: R25
Base cost: R10 (see step 2 supra)
Capital gain (proceeds – base cost): R15
Step 5: Calculate Yvonne’s capital gain in respect of the sale of the increased share (original share):
Proceeds: R75
Base cost: R0 (see step  supra)
Capital gain (proceeds – base cost): R75 – 0 = R15
Step : Calculate Yvonne’s total capital gain:
Capital gain from the value shift: R25
Capital gain from the sale of the later share: R15
Capital gain from the sale of the original share: R15
Total capital gain: R5
Yvonne’s total capital gain of R5 is equal to the increase in value of the later 
share (R0) and 1/ (R15) of the increase in value of the original share (this 1/ 
represents that part of the increase in the value of the original share (R5) that 
relates to the period after 1 October 2001).
6	 Conclusion
The article argues that the South African value shifting anti-avoidance meas-
ures are flawed in two important aspects. The first flaw is the fact that these 
measures have not been properly integrated with the general CGT regime. The 
main problem is the lack of a coherent approach as to which “asset”, if any, 
is disposed of under a value shifting arrangement. As a result, the anti-avoid-
ance measures do not interact well with the general provisions of the Eighth 
Schedule, which assume that all disposals involve the realisation of an “asset”. 
In contrast, the Australian anti-avoidance measures have recognised this as a 
problem and have implemented specific rules governing which “asset” is dis-
posed of under a value shift. For example, under the 19 ITAA, value shifts 
87 This is a simplified version of steps 1 to  of the method statement in s 725-5
88 This is a simplified version of the method statement in s 725-75
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were expressly treated as part-disposals of the decreased shares. This ensured 
a much smoother integration with the general CGT regime. A similar solution 
will work equally well in South Africa and will solve many of the interpreta-
tional problems addressed in the first part of this article.
The second flaw in the anti-avoidance measures is their failure to recognise 
value shifts between shares owned by the same person. The article illustrates 
how this may give rise to either timing benefits, or permanent tax savings. In 
contrast, these kinds of value shifting are recognised as value shifts under the 
1997 ITAA and will give rise to either both CGT and adjustments to the base 
costs of the shares, or to adjustments to the base costs of the shares only.
In light of the threat that share value shifting holds for the integrity of any 
CGT regime, the South African legislator is urged to address these flaws. This 
will also provide much needed certainty to taxpayers regarding the law pertain-
ing to this difficult area of CGT.
OPSOMMING
 Belastingvermyding in die vorm van waardeverskuiwingsreëlings met betrekking tot aandele skep 
’n bedreiging vir die integriteit van die Suid-Afrikaanse kapitaalwinsbelastingbedeling. As teenvoeter 
hiervoor bevat die Agtste Bylae tot die Inkomstebelastingwet, 58 van 191 teenvermydingsbepalings 
wat daarop gemik is om hierdie vorm van belastingvermyding aan te spreek. Die artikel vergelyk hierdie 
bepalings met soortgelyke bepalings in die Australiese belastingwetgewing en identifiseer twee tekortko-
minge in die Suid-Afrikaanse bepalings: eerstens is die bepalings nie na wense met die res van die Agtste 
Bylae geïntegreer nie en tweedens is die omvang van die bepalings te beperk.
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